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Notes
Requirement of a Second Forum for
Application of Forum Non Conveniens
Pnnciples underlying the doctrine of forum non conventens
- convenience of the court or of the parties - may suggest
that a court defer consideration of a particular case in favor
of a more appropriate forum, even though the defendant is
not subject to involuntary process in that second forum. The
author of this Note analyzes the considerations and con-
cludes that it is desirable, under these circumstances, to
permit the court to order a dismissal conditioned upon the
defendant's submitting to the jurisdiction of the more
approprate forum.
Introduction
THE doctrine of forum non convemens "deals with the dis-
cretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a possessed juris-
diction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more
appropriately tried elsewhere."I The trial court may dismiss an
action if, in its discretion, it decides that the action would be more
appropriately tried in another forum because of considerations such
as residence of the parties, availability of witnesses, ease of access
to sources of proof, place where the cause of action arose, or con-
venience of the court.' Before an action may be dismissed under
this doctrine there must necessarily be another forum available in
which the plaintiff can subject the defendant to jurisdiction. If
there were not, a dismissal would leave the plaintiff with no way
to get his cause of action to trial unless the original forum would
permit him to recommence his action there.3
1. Blar, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conventens in Anglo-American Law, 29
CoLUM. L. 1Egv. 1 (1929).
2. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
In addition to Blairs article, supra note 1, for discussions of the doctrine of
forum non convemens, see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conocniens, 35
CAxLF. L. 11Ev. 380 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HAnv.
L. REv. 908 (1947); Damow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILT. L. REv. 867
(1935); Foster, Place of Tral-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Ad-
pastment, 44 Htav. L. REv. 41 (1930).
3. Some courts do permit a plaintiff to re-enter if he shows he was prejudiced
by the dismissal. See, e.g., Gore v. United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 801, 314, 104
A.2d 670, 677 (1954).
4. Record, p. 51, Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 89 N.W.2d 654 (Minn.
1958).
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Trial courts in Minnesota 4 and New Jersey 5 have granted condi-
tional dismissals on grounds of forum non convenienso upon the
defendant's consent to appear in the more appropriate forum even
though he was not amenable to involuntary process there.7 The
judgment of the Minnesota trial court was reversed in Hill v. Upper
Mississippi Towing Corp.,8 because the Minnesota Supreme Court
understood the doctrine to require "at least two forums in which
the defendant is amenable to involuntary process at the time the
suit is started."' On the other hand, in Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S.
Co. 10 the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the dismissal. The
purpose of this Note is to determine which court reached the more
5. Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 131 A.2d 39 (L.), afg'd per
curiam, 25 N.J. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958).
6. The Minnesota trial court dismissed on condition that the defendant appear
within twenty days in an action "of the same scope and nature" brought by the
plaintiff in Tennessee, that he submit to in personam jurisdiction there, waive the
defense of forum non conveniens there, and agree to a jury trial. The court further
provided that if the defendant failed to appear, or the Tennessee court refused to
accept the case, the action would be reinstated "to the calendar with the same
force and effect" as if it had never been dismissed. Record, pp. 50-51, Hill v. Upper
Miss. Towing Corp., 89 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1958).
The order of the New Jersey trial court provided that the plaintiffs had ninety
days in which to bring their actions in Puerto Rico. If the defendants appeared and
carried out the terms of the order, the New Jersey action would thereupon be dis-
missed. The order provided that the defendants agree to waive the statute of limi-
tations, and pay plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees incurred in Instituting the
actions in New Jersey so that the plaintiffs might "have the same relative position
in the courts of Puerto Rico as they [had] . . . in the courts of this State as of
the date these actions were begun." Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super.
536, 552, 131 A.2d 39, 48 (L. 1957).
Although the orders were not identical, since the court in Vargas stayed the
action pending the outcome of proceedings in Puerto Rico, while the trial court in
Hill dismissed but provided for reinstatement (however, the supreme court thought
the trial court's action amounted to a stay, see 89 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1958)),
they are sufficiently similar that both are included within the term "conditional
dismissal" as used in this Note. See definition, text accompanying notes 12-13
infra.
7. The court in Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536. 539, 131
A.2d 39, 40 (L. 1957), found, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that the de-
fendants were not amenable to involuntary process in Puerto Rico. Likewise, the
court in Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 89 N.W.2d 654, 661 (Minn. 1958),
stated that the defendant was not amenable to involuntary process in Tennessee.
The phrase "amenable to involuntary process" apparently means that the forum
has such contacts with a defendant that he may be subjected to its jurisdiction oven
though he is not physically present within the forum. For example, an individual or
corporation may be domiciled within the forum, and so "amenable to involuntary
process" there. Apparently neither court considered a defendant to be "amenable
to involuntary process" in a particular forum even though he may have occasion-
ally been found there. See Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., supra at 539, 131 A.2d
at 40; Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., supra at 661.
8. 89 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1958).
9. Id. at 655 (syllabus by the court).
10. 44 N.J. Super. 536, 131 A.2d 39 (L.), aff'd per curiam, 25 N.J. 293, 135
A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958).
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desirable result 1 In answer to this inquiry the Note will first ex-
amine the device of the conditional dismissal to determine whether
it comports with the reasons for applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and then consider independent arguments against
applying the doctrine when the defendant is not amenable to in-
voluntary process in the more convenient forum.
I. THE CoNDrrioNAL Diszsst
A. Description
The type of conditional dismissal with which this Note is con-
cerned is one whereby a trial court, through its inherent powers, 2
dismisses an action upon certain conditions when it determines it-
self to be an inappropriate forum, even though the defendant is not
11. The question of which court reached the more desirable result cannot be
answered satisfactorily by examining authorities. Both courts cited many of the
same authorities, but where one would emphasize a particular authority, the other
would distinguish it.
For example, in both Vargas, 44 N.J. Super. at 551, 131 A.2d at 47, and Hill,
Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 141 F. Supp. 692 (D. Minn. 1956), a federal
district court had transferred the same, or a similar action to a more convenient
forum by 'authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952). See note 52 infra. In Vargas, the
state court lid of the transfer of the similar actions, which involved the same par-
ties defendant: 'It would be odd indeed to say it is convenient for the parties
and witnesses to try their cases in this court on Market Street, but not in thefederal
court on Broad Street, and that the interest of justice is different in the two loca-
tions." 44 N.J. Super. 536, 551, 131 A.2d 39, 47 (L. 1957). The Minnesota Supreme
Court refused to follow the example of the Minnesota federal district court, which
had transferred the Hill action to a Tennessee federal district court. The state
supreme court said § 1404(a) has a "broader application" than forum non con-
veniens since the former calls for mere transfer, while the latter calls for dismissal.
89 N.W.2d 654, 659 (Minn. 1958).
Another example is the treatment the respective courts accorded a New York
case, Rodriguez v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 1955) (memo-
randum decision), where the court granted a conditional dismissal upon the de-
fendant's consent to appear in a more appropriate forum. The New Jersey court in
Vargas thought the "controlling consideration" in the Rodriguez case was the de-
fendant's consent to appear in Puerto Rico. 44 N.J. Super. at 542, 131 A.2d at 42(L. 1957). The Minnesota court in Hill rejected Rodriguez, and Vargas as well,
saying ihey had not "met'the test of appellate review in the jurisdictions from which
they came." 89 N.W.2d at 658.
Other examples illustrating the diametrical approaches taken by the two courts
could be discussed, but such would be superfluous since no authority has yet con-
sidered whether a conditional dismissal is a desirable device in light of the reasons
for the application of forum non conveniens.
12. At least three writers have pointed out that a court has inherent power to
conditionally dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. See Barrett, supra note 2,
at 421; Braucher, supra note 2, at 931-32; Foster, supra note 2, at 50-53. In
several New York cases conditional dismissals have been granted upon defendants'
consent to appear in more appropriate forums See Ivy v. Stoddard, 147 N.Y.S.2d
469 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Rodriguez v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 143 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App.
Div. 1955) (memorandum decision); Villegas De Jesus v. Waterman S.S. Co., 148
N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 1955) (memorandum decision); Wendel v. Hoffman, 18
N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1940).
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amenable to involuntary process in a more appropriate forum. At
the same time, the court retains jurisdiction in order that it may,
if necessary, reinstate the action.'"
The conditions which are attached to any given order will vary
with the needs of the litigants in the particular case. Their purpose
is to assure the plaintiff either that he will be able to enter the
courts of the second forum in essentially the same condition he was
in in the original forum, or that he will have his cause reinstated in
the original forum.'4 Typical conditions are:
(1) Consent to appear in the more convenient forum."8 There
are various devices by which the court can secure the defendant's
consent to appear. For example, the court may simply incorporate
the defendant's previous consent to appear as a term of the dis-
missal order. Even though the court can put teeth in such an order,"1
it is not the surest method to use since the defendant may take
the risks of noncompliance in order to delay the action by not ap-
pearing in the second forum. A more positive method would be one
by which jurisdiction of the defendant would be presently con-
ferred 17 on the courts of the second forum so that if the defendant
did not appear the plaintiff could obtain a default judgment there.
There are two practical means of accomplishing this. First, the de-
fendant could appoint an attorney for service of process who would
appear and be served in the second forum.' Second, the defendant
13. Technically, the court stays the action pending the outcome of proceedings
in the more appropriate forum. If the defendant appears there and performs as
agreed, the original action is thereupon dismissed. See discussion and authorities
note 6 supra.
14. The Minnesota trial court thought that the purpose of the conditions was
to protect the interests of the plaintiff. Interview with Judge Irvin, R. Brand, Min-
neapolis, Minnesota, March 12, 1959. The court in Vargas said 'the plaintiffs, of
course, are entitled to have the same relative position in the courts of Puerto Rico
as they [had] ... in the courts of this State as of the date these actions were
begun." 44 N.J. Super. at 552, 131 A.2d at 48.
15. This condition was found in the orders of both trial courts. See, Record, pp.
50-51, Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 89 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1958); Vargas
v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 552, 131 A.2d 39, 48 (L. 1957). It is
the foundation upon which every conditional dismissal order is built, since it sup-
plies the plaintiff with the necessary second forum which would otherwise be un-
available.
16. See section on remedies for breach of conditions, text accompanying notes
27-33 infra. The threat of these remedies would usually be enough to coerce a de-
fendant into obeying the order, especially since he has already agreed to its terms.
17. Of course, the original forum cannot force the court of the second forum
to exercise its jurisdiction. Within constitutional limits a court may refuse to exor-
cise its jurisdiction. See note 52 infra. Also, the court of the second forum may de-
cide that the methods of conferring jurisdiction on it, stated at notes 17-19 infra,
do not comply with its local law of jurisdiction and thereby refuse the case for
lack of jurisdiction. However, were it to so decide, the action would be reinstated
in the original forum. See notes 28-29 infra.
18. Service on such an attorney will subject the appointor to personal jurisdic-
tion. RETrATEmENT, JuDGMENTs § 18(d) (1942).
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could be served with process of the second forum while still in
the original forum, and required to sign an express written aclmowl-
edgement of service and waiver of further notice."9
(2) Waiver of the statute of limitations.20 This would prevent a
defendant from raising the statute of limitations in the second forum
where the statutory period for initiating an action may have expired.
(3) Posting a bond. If property has been attached in the origi-
nal forum and the plaintiff is fearful of losing the benefits of this
attachment should the suit be tried in another forum, the order
could require the defendant to post a bond in the second forum
equal to the value of the property attached in the first forum.
(4) Payment of plaintiff's costs and attorney's fees. -' In any
case appropriate for such a condition -s the plaintiff would not be
forced to consider the costs and fees of instituting the action in
the original forum as money wasted when his case is dismissed.
Such a condition would also make the defendant pause to reflect
whether a change of forum would be worth the expense of paying
the plaintiff's costs and attorney's fees.
(5) Waiver of the defense of forum non conveniens in the sec-
ond forum.24 This condition would assure the plaintiff that the de-
fendant would not obstruct the trial in the second forum by
interposing this defense which, even if unsuccessful,e would serve
to delay and obstruct a trial on the merits.21
B. Remedies for breach of conditions
If the defendant is sincere in his claim that another forum is a
more convenient one for trial, and that he would rather have trial
19. This means would give the court of the second forum personal jurisdiction
of the defendant. McDonald v. Lightfoot, 299 S.V. 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927);
RTsATEMEN, Junocmm-s § 18(b)(1) (1942). Also, see Townsend v. Beavers, 185
Miss. 312, 188 So. 1 (1939); Daley v. Dennis, 137 Misc. 1, 242 N.Y. Supp. 408
(Cayuga County Ct. 1930).
20. See Vargas v. AL H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 552, 131 A.2d 39, 48(L. 1957); Rodriguez v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 143 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 1955)
(memorandum decision).
21. See Foster, supra note 2, at 50.
22. See Vargas v. A. H. Bull 5.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 552, 131 A.2d 39,
48 (L. 1957).
23. To determine whether the case is one appropriate for awarding the plain-
tiff his costs and attorneys fees the court could look at the equities to determine
whether the plantiff should be awarded these expenses. If, for example, the plaintiff
wanted to remain in the original forum so that he might harass the defendant, the
court probably would conclude he was undeserving of such costs and fees.
24. See Record, p. 51, Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 89 N.V.2d 654 (Minn.
1958).
25. A motion to dismiss in the second forum would probably be denied for the
court there would very likely view the equities of the case in much the same light
as did the court in the original forum.
26. Of course, waiver of forum non conveniens would only be needed where
the more appropriate forum has adopted the doctrine.
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there, this desire to escape from the first forum would be sufficient
incentive for him to appear in the second, since a failure to do so
would result in reinstatement in the original forum. But if he is
seeking a dismissal for purposes of delay, the court has means at
its disposal either to discourage his asking for a dismissal, or if he
does, to insure that he will perform."
For example, since the court has retained jurisdiction the plain-
tiff may recommence the action in the original forum if the de-
fendant does not appear in the second forum,28 or if the court in
the second forum refuses to accept the case. 9 In addition, the court
could grant the plaintiff reimbursement for any expenses, including
attorney's fees, he has incurred in attempting to commence the
action in the second forum, plus the costs of recommencing in the
original forum.30 The court might also demand, as a price for dis-
missing the action, that the defendant consent to entry of judg-
ment against him in the original forum if be does not perform as
he has agreed.31 The defendant should have no qualms about con-
senting to this judgment if he was sincere in his claim that he would
appear voluntarily in the more convenient forum.
Somewhat more drastic remedies at the court's disposal are con-
tempt proceedings against the defendant and his attorneys if they
disobey the order of the court or in any way obstruct justice, 2 or
disbarment of the defendant's attorneys if they deceive the court
by claiming that their client will appear knowing that he does not
intend to do so. 33 Although these remedies are mainly for the
purpose of upholding the dignity and authority of the court, they
likewise coerce the defendant to perform as he has agreed.
27. It should be noted that the court, when it attaches these conditions to its
order, is not compelling the defendant to perform in the same sense that a defendant
would be compelled to perform if a mandatory injunction were issued. Rather, the
court would depend on the deterrent effect the remedies would have on a de-
fendant who entertains thoughts of disobeying the order.
28. See Record, p. 51, Hill v. Upper Miss. Towing Corp., 89 N.W.2d 654 (Minn.
1958).
29. Ibid.
30. Cf., Vargas v. A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 552, 131 A.2d 39,
48 (L. 1957).
31. Such a consent to judgment would be binding on the defendant. Western
Realty v. Phelps, 86 Minn. 52, 90 N.W. 11 (1902); see Minneapolis Gas Light Co. v.
City of Minneapolis, 140 Minn. 400, 168 N.W. 588 (1918). The defendant could
not unilaterally revoke this agreement. Burnett v. Poage, 239 Iowa 31, 29 N.W.2d
431 (1947).
32. See, e.g., Madison v. Montgomery, 206 Ga. 199, 56 S.E.2d 292 (1949); see
also M N. STAT. §§ 588.01(3)(3), .02 (1957).
33. E.g., MiNN. STAT. § 481.15(2) (1957). See, e.g., Griflith v. State Bar, 40
Cal. 2d 470, 254 P.2d 22 (1953); cf. State Bd. of Examiners in Law v. Lane, 93
Minn. 425, 101 N.W. 613 (1904) (per curiam).
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H. DoES = CONDrnONAL DIsmISsAL, ComponT
WITH THE REASONS FOR APPLYING FORUM NON
Co~v~Is?
A. Reasons for applying forum non conveniens
Several reasons exist for applying the doctrine: 11 (1) The plain-
tiff may have selected the particular forum to harass the defend-
ant.35 (2) Witnesses and evidence may be in another state hundreds
of miles away, making a trial much more difficult and expensive
than need be.s3 (3) Court dockets may be crowded with foreign
based causes of action, burdening courts and taxpayers with litiga-
tion with which they have little or no interest.3 7
Although there are arguments for and against forum non conven-
iens itself,3" this Note assumes that it is a salutary doctrine. Wheth-
er the doctrine should be applied when the defendant is not
amenable to involuntary process in the more appropriate forum de-
pends on whether the reasons for applying the doctrine are equally
valid when there is no such second forum.
(1) Harassment
When the plaintiff has a choice between two or more forums in
which he can bring his action, and he chooses the one which is most
inconvenient in order to harass the defendant, he is forum-shop-
ping. 9 Some authorities take the view that forum non conveniens
may not be validly applied unless to relieve the defendant from
forum-shopping.40 According to this view, the doctrine may be ap-
plied only when the defendant is amenable to involuntary process
34. The leading case which spells out reasons for the application of forum non
conveniens is Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The basic purpose
of the doctrine is, of course, to secure trial of the action in the most appropriate
forum available, regardless of particular factors emphasized by a given court.
35. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 34; O'Herin, Forum Non
Conveniens in F.E.L.A. Cases, 1 DzNsE L.J. 48 (1957).
36. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Vargas v.
A. H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 N.J. Super. 536, 131 A.2d 39 (L. 1957), Barrett, supra note
2, at 411-12.
37. See, e.g., De la Bouillerie v. De Vienne, 330 N.Y. 60, 89 N.E.2d 15 (1949);
Blair, supra note 1.
38. For illustrations of contrasting views compare Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947), with id. at 512 (dissenting opinion). Compare Core v. United
States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A.2d 670 (1954) with Boright v. Chicago,
R. L & P. Ry., 180 Minn. 52, 230 N.W. 457 (1930).
39. Although a plaintiff may be said to be forum-shopping when he is selecting a
forum that will be of most benefit to him, as, for example, because the state has
a reputation for generous verdicts, this Note uses it in the sense of vexatious forum-
shopping, with an eye to harassing the defendant.
40. See, e.g., O'Herin, Forum Non Conveniens in F.E.L.A. Cases, 1 DErm-sE
L.J. 48, 68-69 (1957).
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in more than one forum, since otherwise the plaintiff, having no
choice of forums, could not be accused of forum-shopping.
However, the plaintiff may be forum-shopping even though origi-
nally he has only one forum if, before he commences the action, the
defendant executes and delivers a consent to jurisdiction in a more
convenient forum. Since the plaintiff would then have two forums
in which to commence the action a choice of one to harass the de-
fendant would be forum-shopping. If the plaintiff commences his
action before the defendant is able to offer to appear in the more
convenient forum, it cannot be said that the plaintiff is forum-
shopping. But if the plaintiff chooses to remain in the forum to
harass the defendant after he has received prompt notice of the
defendant's willingness to consent to appear in another forum and
pay any costs already incurred by the plaintiff, he is engaged in the
same type of conduct condemned as forum-shopping where he has
a choice of forums originally. The harassment may be equally as
great in either case.
(2) Convenience and expense of trial
When convenience of parties and witnesses and expenses of trial
are considerations in determining whether an action should be dis-
missed under forum non conveniens, these considerations remain
the same whether or not the defendant is amenable to involuntary
process in another forum. If the defendant's amenability is made a
prerequisite to the application of the doctrine, the trial judge must
look to local law of jurisdiction in another forum to determine
whether he may dismiss the pending action, even if he feels that
the action would be more appropriately tried in another forum.
For example, suppose X, a resident of Minnesota, struck and in-
jured a Boston resident, Y, while riding a bicycle on a Boston public
street. Immediately thereafter X left Massachusetts and returned to
Minnesota, where Y brought suit against him. Even assuming that
the case were one appropriate for trial in Massachusetts because
witnesses and sources of proof were there, the action could not have
been dismissed by a Minnesota trial court following the Hill rule
even upon X's consent to appear in a Massachusetts court since X
was not amenable to involuntary process there. Yet, if all facts were
identical except that X was driving a car instead of riding a bicycle,
the action could have been dismissed because of X's amenability to
involuntary process under the Massachusetts motor vehicle
statute.4'
41. MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 90, § 3A (Supp. 1958). This statute provides that by
operating a motor vehicle on the highways of Massachusetts a nonresident is deemed
to have appointed the registrar of motor vehicles his attorney for service of process
(Vol. 43 :11991206
It is clear that the success of a motion to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens in a Minnesota trial court is dependent upon
the local law of Massachusetts.4 Whether a Minnesota court may
apply forum non conveniens to this case which would be more
appropriately tried in Massachusetts depends on such a tenuous dis-
tinction as whether X was riding a bicycle or driving an automobile.
Whatever relevance this distinction has for the legislature of Massa-
chusetts in formulating that state's local law, it has no relevance
here since the criteria of convenience of the parties and witnesses,
and expenses of trial are exactly the same whether X was riding a
bicycle or driving an automobile. Therefore, since forum non con-
veniens is a doctrine "Which resists formalization and looks to the
realities which make for doing justice," 43 to permit a conditional
dismissal in the case of X v. Y comports with a purpose of the doc-
trine which emphasizes convenience of parties and witnesses, and
expenses of trial.
(3) Convenience of the court
It might be argued that when the criterion is convenience of the
court, an action should almost never be dismissed when the de-
fendant is not amenable to involuntary process in another forum
since in such a situation a domiciliary is almost invariably in-
volved;4 therefore the state has a legitimate interest in the dispute
and should not dismiss."
This argument is not sound for two reasons. First, even though
the defendant is not amenable to involuntary process in "another
forum" he is not necessarily a domiciliary of the original forum."
arising out of any accident in which he may be involved while operating such a
motor vehicle in Massachusetts. This statute provides a means whereby a non-
resident can be subjected to in personam jurisdiction even though he is not physi-
cally present within the forum. Hess v. Pawlosld, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
42. This is true not only in the hypothetical example posed in the text, but under
Minnesota law as set down in the Hill case.
43. Koster v. Lurbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 528 (1947).
44. The logic is as follows: Since many states provide for service of process on
domiciliaries who are out of the state, Emtmozwnc, CoNr.cr oF LAws, 95 (1959),
the defendant who is not amenable to involuntary process in "another forum" al-
most certainly must be a domiciliary of the original forum, or some other state
would be able to subject him to its domiciliary statute.
45. That is, since a domiciliary assumedly contributes to the support of the
courts by paying taxes, the courts should be open to him in order that he may
have his disputes heard in his "home! forum.
46. It is not necessary to conclude that a defendant must be a domiciliary of the
original forum just because a court may say, as the court did in the Hill case, 89
N.W.2d 654, 660 (Minn. 1958), that the defendant is not "amenable to involun-
tary process in more than one jurisdiction at the time the suit is started." (Empha-
sis added.) Although that statement was true upon the facts of Hill, what the
court obviously meant was simply that the defendant was not amenable to invol-
untary process in the more appropriate (not merely another) forum. The following
1959] NOTES 1207
1208 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1199
Second, even if the defendant is a domiciliary of the original forum,
the court probably would not have a sufficient interest, from this
fact alone,417 to justify retention of jurisdiction. The defendant is
the party seeking to avoid the jurisdiction of the court of the origi-
nal forum; it would be tenuous indeed to base the deciding interest
of the court on a defendant who wants to leave the forum.
B. Independent arguments
1. It could be argued that to apply forum non conveniens when
the defendant is not amenable to involuntary process in the more
convenient forum gives the defendant a delaying tactic. In addition
to the delay which the plaintiff suffers by unsuccessfully attempting
to bring his action in the second forum, he may also encounter con-
siderable delay in the original forum upon recommencement if he
has lost his place on the calendar.4 Of course, this argument takes
on merit here only where the defendant does not appear in the
second forum, since if he does appear the delay is no greater than
if the defendant were amenable to involuntary process there. In
either case the plaintiff would have to wait his turn in the second
forum.
The answer to this delay argument lies in the stringency of the
example illustrates that even though a court might use such language, the defend-
ant could very well be a domiciliary of some third forum:
Suppose the facts in Hill were such that the defendant corporation was domiciled
in Alaska and did business in Minnesota, so as to have been amenable to involun-
tar) process in both states, when one of its agents committed a tort in Texas, where
the defendant was not amenable to involuntary process. If the action were brought
in Minnesota but Texas happened to be the most appropriate forum, it would have
been ridiculous to permit a dismissal simply because the defendant was amenable
to involuntary process in "another forum"-Alaska, which had no real connection
with the case. Even though it would have satisfied the literal requirement of the
court since "another forum" would have been available, it seems clear from the
tenor of the Hill opinion that the Minnesota court would not have permitted a dis-
missal on grounds of forum non conveniens under such a state of facts. The require-
ment of the Hill case is not that the defendant merely be amenable to involuntary
process in some other forum; he must be so amenable in the more appropriate forum.
47. Of course, the forum may have interests independent of the fact that the
defendant is a domiciliary. However, this Note will not treat these independent
interests.
48. The plaintiff could lose his place on the calendar if the defendant waited
until the trial stage to raise the defense of forum non conveniens. This is unusual,
and the court would most likely deny the motion when presented at such a late
stage in the proceedings unless the defendant's reason for seeking a dismissal were
extremely compelling. There seems to be no justification, outside of a rare change
in circumstances such as a mass migration of key witnesses to a distant state, for
even permitting the defendant to raise forum non conveniens after the answer stage.
However, in New York, cases have been dismissed when the defense was raised at
trial. See, e.g., Waisikoski v. Philadelphia & R. C. & I. Co., 159 N.Y.Supp. 906
(App. Div. 1916); and even on appeal, on the court's own motion. See, e.g., Col-
lard v. Beach, 81 N.Y.Supp. 619 (App. Div. 1903). For a discussion and additional
cases see Barrett, supra note 2, at 418.
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remedies which the court may provide. It is unlikely that a de-
fendant will attempt to use the dismissal for delaying purposes
when doing so could lead to a default judgment, a contempt pro-
ceeding, or disbarment of his attorney.49 Further, the court can,
as it should in every forum non conveniens case, weigh the possibili-
ties of delay when deciding whether the defendant's original mo-
tion for dismissal should be granted. Thus, the defendant would be
tempted to use a conditional dismissal as a delaying tactic only
where the court does not provide adequate remedies for noncom-
pliance with the dismissal order.
2. In the Hill case the Minnesota court said that a conditional
dismissal "in effect, transfers an action to a separate court under a
separate sovereignty. . . . "0 The court knew of "no authority"
for such an interstate "transfer."5' The court was not accurate in
calling a conditional dismissal a transfer, since the so-called "trans-
feree forum" is under no binding obligation to accept the case. 2
At any rate, a conditional dismissal or an "interstate transfer," if the
49. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
50. 89 N.W.2d at 658.
51. Id. at 659.
52. State courts have discretion to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction, as long as
they do not arbitrarily or discriminatorily refuse to do so. See Miles v. Illinois Cen-
tral R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 704 (1942); Douglas v. New Haven R.R., 279 U.S. 377,
387 (1929); Barret, uprta note 2, at 389-90; Blair, supra note 1, at 3-19.
However, a federal court may not refuse to accept a case transferred under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1952).- See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955). Section
1404(a) permits a federal district court, "for the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest of justice.. . [to] transfer any civil action to any other dis-
trict or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
The reviser's notes to this section say "subsection (a) was drafted in accordance
with the doctrine of forum non conveniens. . . . " But the Supreme Court held,
in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, supra, that forum non conveniens and § 1404(a) are not
the same. The Court said the "harshest result" of forum non conveniens was tem-
pered by § 1404(a) which permits transfers on a "lesser showing of inconvenience"
than forum non conveniens which calls for dismissal Id. at 32.
However, many of the same considerations apply to the situations where a state
court must decide whether to apply forum non conveniens when the defendant
is not amenable to involuntary process in the more appropriate forum, and where
a federal court must decide whether it may transfer an action under § 1404(a) to
a district where the action could not have been brought originally. but where it
could now be brought because of the defendant's consent to appear there. Compare
Paramount Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1950) with Blaski v. Hoff-
man, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. granted. 27 U.S.L. WEum 3236 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1959) (No. 597). A recent case note in 45 VA. L. REv. 291 (1959) dis-
cusses the Blaski case and the relation between forum non conveniens and § 1404(a).
However, the author assumes that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is settled
on the side of the Minnesota rule to the effect that an action may not be dismissed
on grounds of forum non conveniens "unless the transferee [query, can even a condi-
tional dismissal be said to be a "transfer"?] forum had jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant, regardless of defendant's waiver [consent]." Id. at 292. (Emphasis
added.) That the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not settled is evident since
Hill and Vargas are directly opposed. Therefore, an analogy to forum non conven-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court would call it such, should stand or fall on its merits, rather
than being condemned merely because it is something new in the
law.
3. Another argument against permitting a conditional dismissal
when the defendant is not amenable to involuntary process in the
more appropriate forum is that execution of a judgment for the
plaintiff may be somewhat easier in a forum in which the defendant
is amenable to involuntary process because of the greater likelihood
that the defendant may own property located there. Although the
plaintiff could sue on a foreign judgment in the state where the
property is located, it would be more inconvenient and expensive
to do so than to sue in the state in which the property is located
and execute the judgment there.
This argument is not convincing. By a proper conditional dis-
missal the court can protect this interest of the plaintiff by simply
requiring the defendant to post a bond in the second forum equal
to the value of any property attached in the first forum. The plain-
tiff then would be able to execute a judgment gained in the second
forum with as much ease as if he had gained it in the original forum.
Conclusion
The decision of the New Jersey court in the Vargas case was
based on a proper and desirable interpretation of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. A conditional dismissal on grounds of forum
non conveniens upon the defendant's consent to appear in the
more appropriate forum, even though he is not amenable to in-
voluntary process there, comports fully with the reasons for apply-
ing the doctrine. The New Jersey rule leaves application of forum
non conveniens to the sound discretion of the trial court.
The rule declared by the Minnesota court in the Hill case is
unfortunate 53 in that it engrafts a double standard on the doctrine.
iens would not be conclusive, nor even very helpful, in deciding the analogous ques-
tion under § 1404(a), since forum non conveniens itself is not settled.
Some articles and notes which discuss various ramifications of § 1404(a) are,
Black and Black, Injustices in the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Rule, 3 UTAU L.
REV. 314 (1953); Keeffe, Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial
Code, 38 VA. L. REv. 569 (1952); Comment, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 507 (1953); Note,
51 COLum. L. REv. 762 (1951); Note, 24 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 208 (1955).
53. It is clear from the holding of the Hill case that the Minnesota court looks
with a jaundiced eye on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See 89 N.W.2d 654
(Minn. 1958). It seems likely that if another opportunity to further restrict the
doctrine presents itself in a future case, the court will not pass it by. See 43 MINN.
L. REv. 160, 162 (1958).
It seems that the court regrets Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 243 Minn. 58,
66 N.W.2d 763 (1954), which overruled Boright v. Chicago, R.I. & P. fy., 180
Minn. 52, 230 N.W. 457 (1930), where the court had sanctioned importing of ac-
tions into Minnesota in these words: "it always has been our holding that our courts
are open to those from other states for the trial of transitory causes of action whether
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A Minnesota trial court must first look to see if the prerequisite of
the defendant's amenability to involuntary process in the more
appropriate forum is complied with; then, assuming this prerequi-
site is met and the court may apply the doctrine, the court can look
at the equities of the case to determine whether it should apply
forum non conveniens and dismiss. The effect of the Hill case is to
say to the trial courts of Minnesota: "you may apply forum non
conveniens only in cases where the prerequisite is met, regardless
whether the case is one in which the doctrine should be applied."
Such-a rule denies a trial court the power to administer justice in
forum non conveniens cases unless an arbitrary and mechanical
prerequisite is met. The Minnesota rule "is hardly one to commend
itself for general acceptance."54
based upon common law or the statute of a sister state or a statute of the United
States." Id. at 59, 230 N.W. at 460.
"It is not our law that a so-called discretion can be exercised against those com-
ing from other states." Id. at 60, 230 N.W. at 460.
Of Boright one writer has said:
The victory was for the personal injury racket - not, however, without a vigor-
ous dissent. Thriving under a highly organized and thus far judicially tolerated
system of ambulance chasing, and the old beliefs as to the effect of the privi-
leges and immunities clause, the spectacle of vexatiously imported litigation
has long been familiar in Minnesota. The majority opinion in the Boright case
suggests that judges are perhaps becoming callous to it. It seemed that the
common law power to adapt procedure to prevent its abuse had atrophied from
disuse, and the court found on non-constitutional grounds that it was powerless
to dismiss such suits. Instead of regretting this situation, it glorified the Min-
nesota law for its hospitality to strangers, thus indicating that it was still
thinking in terms of a philosophy which assimilates a would-be litigant to a
laborer or business man entitled to a free opportunity to try his luck in what-
ever state he chooses. Compelled by the United States Supreme Court to aban-
don any constitutional sanction for this theory, the majority of the Court still
stubbornly adheres to it as determining at least the domestic policy of the state.
The decision is hardly one to commend itself for general acceptance.
Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment,
44 HAv. L. REv. 41, 59-60 (1930).
Save for what may be left of Johnson v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., supra, Foster's
words could well have been written about the Minnesota law of today.
54. Foster, supra note 53, at 60.
